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1China's Urban Unemployment: Exposed
"Disguised Unemployment" or Insufficient Aggregate Demand
Minqi Li*
China’s enterprise reform has resulted in large-scale layoff of workers from state and collective
owned enterprises.  Mainstream Chinese economists argue that many of the workers in these
enterprises are “disguisedly unemployed” and have to be laid off to achieve better economic
performance.  In this paper, I argue that the productivity of state and collective owned
enterprises to a large extent depends on capacity utilization and the level of aggregated demand.
 If the government undertakes active aggregate demand policy, the performance of state and
collective owned enterprises can be substantially improved without large number of workers
being laid off.
1. Introduction
Since late 1970s China has been undertaking market-oriented economic reform.  Unlike in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union, until early 1990s there had been no privatization of state and collective
owned enterprises.  In 1980s state and collective owned enterprises continued to provide job security and
other benefits to the urban sector workers.  Rapid economic growth was accompanied by rising living
standards for the majority of people.  In 1992, in the Fourteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party,
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2it was decided that China's goal of reform was to build a "socialist market economy."  Next year, at the
Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Congress, it was decided that the existing system of state and
collective owned enterprises was to be replaced by the "modern enterprise system" based on " clarified
property right, clearly defined responsibility and authority, separation of enterprises from the government,
and scientific management."  The Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997 took a further step, deciding that while
collective owned enterprises and small state owned enterprises were to be privatized, large and medium-
sized state owned enterprises were to be restructured as share holding corporations. 
The enterprise reform in 1990s has resulted in large-scale layoff of workers.  In 1980s there was
virtually full employment in the urban sector.  But since 1993, urban unemployment has been growing
rapidly.  By 1997, about 18.5 million workers had been laid off from state owned enterprises and urban
collective enterprises, raising the actual urban unemployment rate to as high as about 10 percent.  Table 1
shows the rapid growth of urban unemployment in 1990s.
Unlike in 1980s, in 1990s while the economy has continued to grow rapidly, the living standards
of working people have been growing slowly, and for a significant part of them, have declined.  Many of
the laid off workers are living in poverty.  The stagnation and the decline of the living standards of the
majority people and rising inequality have undermined the legitimacy of the market-oriented reform,
generated large number of protests and social unrest, and raised serious questions to the current strategy
of reform (He, 1998, pp. 218-244).
In this paper I will focus on the unemployment in China's urban sector.  I will argue that as far as
the employment consequences of the enterprise reform are concerned, the current economic reform is
misconceived and based on unsound theoretical beliefs.  The rapidly rising urban unemployment is neither
3desirable nor necessary.  By pursuing active macroeconomic policies intended to maintain and increase the
level of aggregate demand, the efficiency of state and collective owned enterprises can be substantially
improved without laying off of workers, with socially as well as economically desirable results.  Part 2 of
the paper presents and criticizes the argument of mainstream Chinese economists that the so-called
redundant workers in state and collective owned enterprises are “disguisedly unemployed” and have to be
laid off in order to achieve efficiency improvement.  Part 3 of the paper argues that the underutilization of
the labor force in state and collective owned enterprises may be caused by insufficient aggregate demand
and an increase of the level of aggregate demand could lead to higher measured productivity and help to
eliminate “disguised unemployment.”  This hypothesis is tested in part 4 and 5.  Part 6 discusses the likely
effect of active aggregate demand policy on “disguised unemployment” based on the empirical results
presented in part 4 and 5.
[Table 1 is here]
2. State and Collective Owned Enterprises and "Disguised Unemployment"
Mainstream Chinese economists argue that the system of state property is in fundamental conflict
with the basic requirements of a market economy (Liu and Gao, 1999, pp. 87-93; ZGFB, 1999).  State
owned enterprises suffer from unclarified property rights, which tend to increase transaction costs and lower
the efficiency of market transactions.  Related to this is the problem of "soft budget constraints" and the
inability of the government as the principal to enforce the contracts with the agents--the managers of state
owned enterprises.  The managers have the authority to dispose of the assets of state owned enterprises
4but do not have to bear the risks which are involved in the use of the assets.  Losses and inefficiency are
therefore unavoidable.
A similar critique is made to urban collective enterprises.  Urban collective enterprises are
technically owned by the workers, though the managers of these enterprises are often appointed by the local
government and the behavior of these enterprises is widely considered to be similar to that of state owned
enterprises (Simon, 1996, pp.274-284).  Mainstream Chinese economists argue that the collective property
is ill defined and the workers, without individual ownership stake in the firm, are not motivated adequately
and do not care about the long term development of the firm.  Government involvement in the management
contributes to the inefficiency of urban collective enterprises by reproducing the soft budget constraint
problem from which the state owned enterprises suffer. 
The labor regime of state and collective owned enterprises is also believed to be inefficient. 
Mainstream Chinese economists argue that under the pre-reform system, instead of having the market
determine the efficient level of employment, the level of employment is determined by labor supply. 
Government objectives dominate economic concerns and employment is essentially offered to all urban
residents as a part of social welfare.  The system results in excessive labor supply that is absorbed by state
and collective owned enterprises without considering efficiency criteria.  In this view, a large segment of
those employed in state and collective owned enterprises are actually "redundant." (ZGFB, 1999, pp. 468-
470) 
There have been different estimates of the share of redundant workers in the total urban sector
employment.  A survey by the International Labor Organization and the Chinese Labor Department in 1995
estimated that redundant workers accounted for 18.8 percent of the state sector employment.  The Chinese
5State Statistical Bureau believes that about 20 percent of the state sector workers are “redundant.”  The
State System Reform Commission and the State Council Development Research Center estimate the ratio
to be 25 percent.  Liu and Gao argue that the ratio could be as high as 40 percent (Liu and Gao, 1999, pp.
299-302).  The World Bank (1999, p.60) estimates that there are 16-36 million of redundant workers in
state and urban collective owned enterprises.
Mainstream Chinese economists argue that the redundant workers in state and collective owned
enterprises should properly be categorized as constituting a pool of “disguisedly unemployed” workers.
 Because while these workers do receive income from their employment, their employment cannot be
justified on efficiency grounds.  Formally, the argument can be illustrated by figure A.
[Figure A is here]
In a market economy, the labor market is cleared at C where labor supply equals labor demand.
 However, in the pre-reform non-market economy, the government decides that the wage setting curve is
AB and everyone who is willing to work at the prevailing wage is to be offered a job. Excess labor supply
results because the supply of labor indicated by point B is greater than the demand for labor indicated by
point A.  Nevertheless the workers between A and B are employed by state owned or urban collective
enterprises rather than left unemployed.  However, at B, the wage level set by the government is above the
marginal product of labor which is indicated by point D.  This suggests that the employment between A and
B is inefficient and not profitable.  It therefore must be regarded as "disguised unemployment."
Mainstream Chinese economists argue that in the transition to the market economy, it is no longer
6possible for state and collective enterprises, which for the most part have failed to compete with private
enterprises effectively and are suffering from deteriorating profitability, to maintain the inefficient labor regime
characterized by disguised unemployment.  As such, the proponents of this view recognize that the
“disguised unemployment” has to be exposed and turned into explicit unemployment.  While this may have
some undesirable social consequences in the short run, they do not see any practical alternative.  Moreover,
by freeing the redundant workers from inefficient state owned enterprises, it is possible to re-allocate these
workers to private enterprises and the growing service industries where they can be more efficiently
employed.  In the long run, this will contribute to higher efficiency and higher living standards.  Following
this logic, the Chinese government decided in 1997 to accelerate the pace of privatization and layoff of
workers.  While 15 million workers had already been laid off from the state sector by 1997, it was planned
that between 1998-2000, 15-20 million more workers were to be laid off, increasing the total laid off
workers from the state sector to more than 30 million (ZGFB, 1998, 469). 
There are several problems with the mainstream argument.  First, firms that provide job security to
their workers may suffer from "disguised unemployment" during the downturn of business cycles.  But by
offering the workers a long-term stake in the firm, job security encourages workers to make investment in
firm specific human capital and may contribute to higher productivity in the long run (Aoki ,1988; Boyer,
1993; Lo, 1997).  Buchele and Christiansen (1999) find that strong worker rights encourage workers'
participation and are often associated with higher productivity growth.
Further, mainstream economists have failed to take into account the macroeconomic benefits of
"disguised unemployment."  When an economic downturn occurs, state and collective owned enterprises,
help to dampen the multiplier effect and alleviate the effect of any unfavorable demand shock through
7maintaining their employment.  By comparison, private enterprises tend to reduce employment and wage
expenditures when shortfall of market demand occurs.  Falling employment and wages further reduce the
level of expenditure and tend to amplify the decline of aggregate demand.
Mainstream Chinese economists appear to have assumed that the transition costs for the workers
who are displaced from state or collective owned enterprises to be re-employed in the private sector would
be either negligible or way below the potential benefits of the re-allocation.  However, this is unlikely to be
the case.  The workers in state and collective owned industrial enterprises are among the most skilled of
China's blue-collar labor force.  However, the skills or the human capital that they have accumulated on
their jobs are not likely to be useful in the services industries that are generating most new jobs.  Private
enterprises are mostly characterized by low productivity, low wages, terrible working conditions and they
use large number of unskilled workers.  Thus, even if the workers displaced from state or collective owned
enterprises are lucky enough to get jobs in private enterprises or service industries, it is likely that their skills
would have to be downgraded substantially.  This implies an enormous loss of human capital.  
While it is true that state and collective owned enterprises have been suffering from a profitability
crisis in recent years, the decline of profitability is not restricted to the state and the collective sector, but
has actually occurred across enterprises of all types of ownership.  The China Statistical Yearbook
(various issues) provides profit rate data for industrial enterprises with independent accounts of different
types of ownership.  Measured by the ratio of the sum of profits and taxes to the original value (book value)
of fixed assets.  The state sector profit rate fell from 20.2 percent in 1988 to 7.3 percent in 1998.  The
collective sector profit rate fell from 27.3 percent in 1988 to 16.3 percent in 1998.  In the so called "other"
sector, which includes primarily foreign invested enterprises and enterprises invested by owners in Hong
8Kong, Macau and Taiwan,  the profit rate fell from 32.7 percent in1988 to 9.1 percent in 1998.  Thus,
between 1988-98, the profit rate fell by 63.9 percent in the state sector, 40.3 percent in the collective
sector, and 72.2 percent in the other sector.  Thus, the decline of profitability is neither restricted nor
particularly severe in the state or the collective sector.  The widespread decline of profitability suggests that
the profitability crisis of state and collective owned enterprises is more a reflection of the general
deterioration of the macroeconomic environment than a problem that results from ownership-specific
microeconomic inefficiencies.  If this is the case, then the solution to the problem must primarily be found
in macroeconomic management rather than microeconomic adjustments such as layoff of workers.   
3. Alternative Perspective: Underutilization of the Labor Force Resulting from Insufficient
Aggregate Demand
The Chinese government conducted contractionary monetary policy in 1993 to contain double-digit
inflation.  By the end of 1996, the government declared that a "soft landing" had been successfully
accomplished.  However, the economy continued to slow down.  In 1998, the Chinese economy was
literally in deflation.  The growth rates of consumer and producer prices fell into the negative territory, while
economic growth rate fell to the lowest point since 1991.  Price deflation and losing momentum of economic
growth suggest substantial shortfalls in aggregate demand. 
While the reasons for insufficient demand are manifold, including the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis,
one may suspect that the misconceived enterprise reform and the large- scale layoff of workers have played
an important part.  Table 1 suggests that between 1993 and 1997, the actual urban unemployment rate
increased from about 3 percent to about 10 percent.  Assume a worker's annual income is half of the urban
9sector's per employee output and a laid off worker loses half of her or his typical annual income.  This
implies that an increase of unemployment rate by 7 percent will lead to a direct fall of the urban sector
aggregate income by 1.75 percent.  The total effect on aggregate demand must be considerably larger when
the multiplier effects are taken into account.
In the standard neoclassical synthesis macroeconomic model, a fall of aggregate demand actually
results in higher labor productivity.  The fall of prices raises the real wage and forces the employers to hire
less workers.  At lower level of employment, the marginal product of labor is higher, restoring equilibrium.
 A Classical or New Classical economist would have argued that this does not have to happen if the worker
could realize that the fall of prices has actually increased the real wage, and in turn increases labor supply.
 Thus, while the labor demand curve shifts to the left, the labor supply curve (as a function of nominal wage)
should shift to the right, resulting in lower nominal wage but higher level of employment.
The standard model assumes that the stock of capital is fixed in the short run and does not take
account of changes in capacity utilization.  The prediction of the standard model is not consistent with
empirical observations.  Productivity is typically lower rather than higher during a recession.  This is because
firms typically have large portion of the capital stock left idle during a recession.  If the utilization of the
capital stock is low due to insufficient aggregate demand, then the observed labor productivity would be
lower than it otherwise could be even without changes in technology.  In this case, the employers would hire
fewer workers even if workers are willing to accept lower nominal wage in response to lower prices.
For Chinese state or collective owned enterprises, one can make a case that the impact of
aggregate demand on productivity would have to be stronger than what is usually the case in a market
economy.  Because state and collective owned enterprises provide job security to their employees, one
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would expect that for these enterprises, not only the capital stock but also the level of employment is a
"fixed" input.  Thus, a fall of aggregate demand would result in not only the underutilization of the capital
stock but also the underutilization of the labor force.  Thus, labor productivity fell for two reasons, because
of the fall of the actually utilized capital stock, and because of the decrease of the degree of utilization of the
labor force itself.  Since the labor input is "fixed," a fall of labor productivity would be translated into an
increase of "redundant" workers in state or collective owned enterprises.  But if this is the case, then in
principle, the so called "disguised unemployment" could be eliminated by increasing the level of aggregate
demand.  For an increase of aggregate demand could substantially improve the efficiency of state and
collective owned enterprises by eliminating the underutilization of not only the capital stock but also the labor
force, allowing the marginal product of labor to be lifted to a level above the real wage.
We can derive this conclusion through the following simple model.  Assume a standard Cobb-
Douglas production function (Y, K, L are for output, capital and labor), which takes the capacity utilization
of the capital stock into account.  The production function is written as:
(1) Y = A(ZK)áLâMã
where Z is capacity utilization and M is intermediate inputs (materials).  Let "y" be Y/L, then the production
function is re-written as:
(2) y = A(ZK)áLâ-1Mã
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Clearly, "y" is positively dependent upon Z, and ¶y/¶Z is áy/Z.  In a production function for Chinese
state or collective owned enterprises, there are "redundant" workers.  Thus, not only the capital stock but
also the labor force may not be fully utilized.  A production function of state or collective owned enterprises
may take the form:
(3) Y = A(ZK)á(ZL)âMã
The productivity of state and collective owned enterprises is therefore more strongly dependent
upon the utilization of capacity.
(4) y = AZá+âKáLâ-1Mã, ¶y/¶Z = (á+â)y/Z > 0
Now consider a revised Keynesian macroeconomic model of the following form:1
(5) AD = a + b1(N) + b2(Z), b1' > 0, b2' > 0
(6) AS = pY = pñZK
(7) AD = AS
(8) p = ì + wN/Y = ì + w/y(N, Z), ¶y/¶N < 0, ¶y/¶Z > 0
(9) w = ph(N), h' > 0
(5) gives the aggregated demand equation, where "a" is the autonomous expenditure which can be
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determined by the government, b1(N) is the part of expenditure which depends upon the income from
employment, and b2(Z) is the part of expenditure which directly depends on capacity utilization (for instance,
higher capacity utilization may encourage investment).  (6) is the aggregate supply function, which is equal
to the total nominal output.  "ñ" is the output to utilized capital ratio, and the capital stock is assumed to be
constant.2  (7) sets up the equilibrium condition.
(8) is the mark up equation (the equivalent of the labor demand equation in the standard model),
where price is determined by adding a mark up factor "ì" to the unit labor cost, which is exogenously
determined nominal wage (for example, it may depend on monetary conditions) divided by productivity.
 Productivity is assumed to be positively dependent on capacity utilization, and negatively dependent on the
level of employment.  (9) is the bargaining equation (the equivalent of the labor supply function in the
standard model).  Thus, instead of assuming workers decide labor supply based on the preference between
real wage and leisure, real wage is assumed to be determined by workers' bargaining strength, which is here
assumed to be a positive function of the employment level.
There are five equations and five unknowns (AD, AS, Z, N, p).  The good market (equation 5-7)
can be illustrated by figure B.  
[Figure B is here]  
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Figure B shows that the aggregate demand is positively dependent on capacity utilization.  The
intercept of the aggregate demand curve is the sum of autonomous expenditure and the part of expenditure
that depends on the income resulting from employment.  When aggregate demand is AD0, the equilibrium
capacity utilization is Z0.  At Z0, there is a unique mark up schedule in the labor market, which is shown in
Figure C.
[Figure C is here]
In Figure C, the mark up curve (MU) and the wage setting curve (WS) together determine the
equilibrium level of employment and the real wage.3  If the government engages in expansionary
macroeconomic policy, in Figure B, the aggregate demand curve will be pushed up from AD0 to AD1,
raising capacity utilization from Z0 to Z1.  In the labor market, the increase of capacity utilization increases
productivity, allowing firms to charge lower prices.  The mark up curve is therefore shifted up.  At the new
equilibrium, the employment level is higher, and the price level is lower (implied by higher real wage).  These
changes should feed back to the good market, resulting in further shift up of the aggregate demand curve
and the aggregate supply curve should rotate clockwise with lower prices.  This will raise the capacity
utilization to an even higher level.  The feedbacks should continue until the good market equilibrium is
consistent with the labor market equilibrium.
For state and collective owned enterprises, the equilibrium level of employment in Figure C may
be understood as the level of employment desired by the management, and any employment above the
14
“desired” employment would be “disguised unemployment.”  An expansion of aggregate demand could
bring about a higher level of “desired” employment, thus reducing the level of "disguised unemployment."
4. Testing the Alternative Perspective
In this section, I will test the hypothesis that the productivity of state and collective owned
enterprises is strongly dependent upon capacity utilization in the industrial sector.  If this hypothesis is not
rejected, it would be possible for one to argue that active aggregate demand policies that lead to higher
capacity utilization may result in substantial improvement in the observed efficiency of state and collective
owned enterprises and  "disguised unemployment" in these enterprises could be dealt with by active
aggregate demand policies rather than by laying off workers.  I will also test to what extent the productivity
of private enterprises depends on capacity utilization.
The relationship to be tested is as follows:
(10) Y = AKâ1Lâ2Mâ3Zâ4
which is equivalent to:
(11) y = Akâ1mâ3Lâ1+â2+â3-1Zâ4
where "k" and "m" are the capital-labor ratio and the materials-labor ratio respectively.  Rewrite equation
15
(11) in growth rate form:
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(12) (dy/dt)/y = â0 + â1(dk/dt)/k + â3(dm/dt)/m + (â1 + â2 + â3 - 1)(dL/dt)/L + â4(dZ/dt)/Z
For state and collective owned enterprises, â4 is expected to be positive and significant.  For “other
enterprises,” which are private enterprises, â4 is also expected to be positive, but the estimated coefficient
is expected to be smaller than that for state and collective owned enterprises. 
Data
To test equation (12), it is necessary to have the following data: output, capital input, materials
input, labor input, and capacity utilization.  The China Statistical Yearbook (CSY, 1985-1999) provides
the relevant data or the necessary information from which the required data can be constructed for the
industrial enterprises with independent accounts.  In 1997, all industrial enterprises with independent
accounts accounted for 58.7 percent of China's gross output value of industry.  In the same year, the state
owned enterprises accounted for 41.7 percent of the total output of all industrial enterprises with
independent accounts, the collective owned enterprises accounted for 29.6 percent, the share holding
corporations accounted for 7.4 percent, the foreign owned enterprises accounted for 12.3 percent, and the
enterprises owned by residents in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan accounted for 9.0 percent. 
Before 1993, the share holding corporations, the foreign owned enterprises, and the enterprises
owned by residents in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are all included in the category of "other
enterprises."  The share holding corporations were originally state owned enterprises that were later
restructured as corporations.  The government continues to have majority ownership in most of these
corporations.  Thus, it is more appropriate to include them into the state sector.  For the rest of this paper,
17
the "state owned enterprises" refer to not only those that are referred to as the state owned enterprises
according to the Chinese official statistical categorization, but also those that are referred to as the share
holding corporations.  Data for the state owned enterprises and the collective owned enterprises are
available or can be constructed for 1980-98.  Data for other enterprises are not available until 1988.  Since
1993, the foreign owned enterprises and the enterprises owned by the residents in Hong Kong, Macau and
Taiwan are combined as "other enterprises."  Thus, for other enterprises, data are available or can be
constructed for 1988-98.
For details of data construction, see Appendix.
Results
Table 2 presents the regression results for the state owned enterprises.  The dependent variable is
the growth rate of productivity (output per employee).  The independent variables are the growth rate of
capital-labor ratio, the growth rate of materials-labor ratio, the growth rate of labor input, and the annual
change of capacity utilization rates.  Three regressions are run.  The first does not include capacity utilization.
 The result of the second regression suggests that capacity utilization has positive and significant impact on
the productivity of the state owned enterprises.  A one percent increase of capacity utilization is associated
with about 0.7 percent increase of productivity.  The third regression corrects for auto-correlation by using
the iterative Cochrane-Orcutt procedure, the estimated coefficient of CAPACITY is 0.75 and strongly
significant.
[Table 2 is here]
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Table 3 presents the regression results for the collective owned enterprises.  The result of the
second regression suggests that a one percent increase of capacity utilization is associated with 0.59 percent
increase of productivity.  But the coefficient of CAPACITY is not significant.  The D-W statistic is 1.35,
suggesting strong auto-correlation.  However, when auto-correlation is corrected, the coefficient of
CAPACITY is estimated to be 0.79, slightly higher than that for the state owned enterprises.
[Table 3 is here]
Table 4 presents the regression results for other enterprises.  The second regression reports that
a one percent increase of capacity utilization is associated with 0.51 percent increase of productivity.  D-W
statistic suggests strong auto-correlation.  The third regression corrects for auto-correlation and finds that
the coefficient of CAPACITY is reduced to 0.375 and not significant.
[Table 4 is here]
 
The results reported in Table 2, 3, and 4 are generally consistent with the hypothesis that the
productivity of the state and collective owned enterprises is positively correlated with capacity utilization,
which reflects the level of aggregate demand.  Moreover, the regression results suggest that the increase of
capacity utilization tends to have a larger and more definite impact on the productivity of state and collective
owned enterprises than the impact on the productivity of other enterprises.  While a one percent increase
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of capacity utilization is associated with 0.7-0.75 percent increase of productivity of the state owned
enterprises, and 0.59-0.79 percent increase of productivity of the collective enterprises, it is only associated
with 0.38-0.51 percent increase of productivity of other enterprises. 
To the extent the variable of capacity utilization, as is measured in this study, does reflect the level
of aggregate demand, the regression results reported in Table 3-5 suggest that the government may use
active aggregate demand policies that lead to higher capacity utilization, which in turn leads to higher
productivity of the state owned and the collective enterprises, to deal with "disguised unemployment."  The
validity of this argument apparently depends on the assumption that capacity utilization does reflect the level
of aggregate demand and does respond to changes in autonomous demand variables.  The government does
not directly control capacity utilization, but it should be able to control or influence certain autonomous
demand variables (such as government expenditures or investment).  Therefore, it is necessary to establish
the relations between autonomous demand variables and capacity utilization, and the relations between
autonomous demand variables and productivity. 
5. Autonomous Demand, Capacity Utilization and Productivity
Table 5 reports the results of three regressions.  Capacity utilization is the dependent variable.
Independent variables are INVESTMENT, FISCAL, EXPORTS, IMPORTS, INVLAG, FISLAG,
EXLAG, and IMLAG.  INVESTMENT is the nominal growth rate of total fixed investments, FISCAL is
the nominal growth rate of the non-investment central and local government expenditures, EXPORTS and
IMPORTS are the nominal growth rates of merchandise exports and imports, and INVLAG, FISLAG,
EXLAG, and IMLAG are the one year lag of INVESTMENT, FISCAL, EXPORTS, and IMPORTS
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respectively.  Among all independent variables, INVESTMENT is the only one that is significantly and
positively correlated with capacity utilization.  A one percent increase of the nominal growth rate of
investment is associated 0.25 percent increase of the capacity utilization rate.  The regression results suggest
that the government may use public investment as a tool to achieve the desirable capacity utilization rate.
[Table 5 is here]
The central government, the local governments, and the state owned enterprises together accounts
for over 50 percent of the total fixed investments.  About five percent of the total fixed investments are
directly financed by government fiscal budget, and about 20 percent of the total fixed investments are
financed by loans provided by the state owned banks.  Thus, through its control over the fiscal budget and
the state owned banks, the central government directly controls about 25 percent of total investments; and
through its influence over the local governments and the state owned enterprises, it may influence the size
and the structure of another 25 percent of the total investments.  Given that the state sector investments
account for over 50 percent of the total fixed investments, and the total fixed investments account for about
35 percent of China's gross domestic product, the Chinese government is in a position to use public
investment as an effective tool to control the level of the total investments and the level of aggregate demand.
   
Table 6 shows how changes in autonomous demand variables impact on the productivity of the
state owned, the collective owned and other enterprises.  The first regression shows that INVESTMENT
has significant and positive impact on the productivity of the state owned enterprises.  A one percent
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increase of total investments is associated with 0.2 percent increase of productivity.  INVESTMENT and
FISCAL have positive impacts on the productivity of the collective owned enterprises.  But none of the two
coefficients is significant.  Interestingly, the productivity of other enterprises is negatively correlated with
INVESTMENT, FISCAL and EXPORTS, but positively correlated with IMPORTS.  These results
confirm the hypothesis that the government may carry out active aggregate demand policy (for example, by
increasing public investment) in order to improve the productivity performance of state and collective owned
enterprises.
[Table 6 is here]
6. Removing “Disguised Unemployment” with Aggregate Demand Policy
To what extent can active aggregate demand policy help to alleviate "disguised unemployment"?
 In 1998, the capacity utilization rate was as low as 0.75.4  If the capacity utilization rate can be increased
by 25 percent, that is, back to its long-term trend, the regression results of Table 2 and 3 suggest that the
productivity of the state owned enterprises can increase by 17.5-19 percent, and the productivity of the
collective enterprises can increase by about 15-20 percent.  In the context of Figure C, an increase of
productivity resulting from an increase of capacity utilization is reflected by a shift up of the mark up curve.
 With the mark up curve shifted up, to increase effective employment, it is necessary to move down along
the new mark up curve until where it intersects the wage setting curve.  How much of “disguised
unemployment” can be eliminated depends on the slope of the mark up curve and the slope of the wage
setting curve.   
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In Table 2, the implied labor elasticity of output for the first, the second, and the third regression
is 0.179, -0.063, and -0.124 respectively.5  In Table 3, the implied labor elasticity of output for the first,
the second, and the third regression is 0.181, 0.111, and 0.095 respectively.  The second and the third
regression in the two tables include capacity utilization in the explanatory variables.  Thus, when capacity
utilization is taken into account, the labor elasticity of output of the state and collective owned enterprises
is estimated to be either negative or close to zero.  Considering that many of the state and collective sector
workers are “disguisedly unemployed,”  these numbers are not surprising.  However, for the purpose of
finding out how much of “disguised unemployment” can be eliminated, one needs to know the labor
elasticity of output not for the total employment, but for the “desired” employment.  The available
information does not tell how much the labor elasticity of output for the “desired” employment is.  But one
should expect it to be a positive number. 
If the labor elasticity of output is zero, it implies that a one percent increase of employment is
associated with one percent fall of productivity.  Thus, the implied slope of the mark up curve would be one.
 Assume a 25 percent increase of capacity utilization raises the productivity of state and collective owned
enterprises by 18 percent, with a flat wage setting curve, the 18 percent increase of productivity can
generate 18 percent increase of “desired” employment with the slope of the mark up curve being one. 
However, the labor elasticity of output for the “desired” employment is most likely greater than zero.  It
follows that the slope of the mark up is most likely smaller than one. Therefore, it is safe to say that a 18
percent increase of productivity can generate at least 18 percent more “desired” employment.
With the labor force more fully utilized, workers may have more bargaining power, resulting in
higher real wages.  As a result, the actual increase of “desired” employment would be smaller than with a
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flat wage setting curve.  To estimate how workers' real wage may increase with the increase of “desired”
employment, I run two regressions, the results of which are reported in Table 7.  In the first regression, the
dependent variable is the growth rate of nominal compensation, which is  the sum of the nominal wage rate
of workers in the state owned industrial enterprises and the average insurance and benefits fund of the state
sector employees.  The relevant data are available in The China Statistical Yearbook.  The independent
variables are the previous year's inflation rate (measured by the producer's price index of industrial
products), the growth rate of the capital-labor ratio (to control for long-term technological changes), and
capacity utilization.  In the second regression, the dependent variable is the inflation rate, measured by the
producer's price index of industrial products, and the independent variables are the previous year's inflation
rate and nominal compensation.  The regression result says that a one percent increase of capacity utilization
is associated with about 0.8 percent increase of nominal compensation, and one percent increase of nominal
compensation is associated with about 0.5 percent increase of the inflation rate.  Thus, a one percent
increase of capacity utilization is associated with about 0.4 percent increase of real wage.
If the government is going to undertake active aggregate demand policy, with the goal of increasing
capacity utilization by about 25 percentages in the course of five years, this would require a nominal growth
rate of total fixed investments of about 20 percent in each year.  This is not unrealistic.  Total fixed
investments grew at an average nominal annual rate of 21.1 percent between 1980 and 1998, and grew at
an average nominal annual rate of 25.8 percent between 1990 and 1998 (CSY, 1999, Table 6-2).  This
would result in a total increase of real wage by about 10 percent.  Since 25 percentages of increase of
capacity utilization can result in about 18 percent increase of productivity, with 10 percent going to the
increase of real wage, there is 8 percent left, which can be translated into the increase of “desired”
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employment.  Assume the slope of the mark up curve is one, this implies an increase of “desired”
employment by 8 percent.  Since most estimates put the share of "redundant workers" in the state sector
employees within the range of 20-25 percent, a 8 percent increase of “desired” employment could eliminate
one-third to two-fifths of the so called "disguised unemployment."  Given that the slope of the mark up curve
is most likely to be smaller than one, the actual amount of “disguised unemployment” that can be eliminated
by active aggregate demand policy is likely to be significantly greater.
The above analysis suggests that if the government undertakes aggregate demand policy based on
the expansion of public investment in a sustained and consistent way, it is possible to substantially alleviate
the “disguised unemployment” in the state and the collective sector and improve the performance of state
and collective owned enterprises.  One possible objection to such a policy would be that the expansion of
aggregate demand may cause excessive inflation pressures.  However, the regression results of Table 7
suggest that the increase of the inflation rate that may result from five years of demand expansion is likely
to be small.  A one percent of the inflation rate in the previous year can be directly translated into about 0.4
percent of inflation in the current year.  Since one percent of the inflation rate in the previous year is
associated with about 0.6 percent increase of nominal compensation, it indirectly leads to about 0.3 percent
more inflation in the current year.  That is, one percent of inflation in the previous year directly and indirectly
results in 0.7 percent of inflation in the current year. 
In recent years, China has been experiencing deflation rather than inflation.  If in each year, capacity
utilization increases by 5 percent, this will result in about 4 percent increase of nominal compensation and
about 2 percent increase of inflation.  Assume we start from a point when the price is falling by one percent
a year, after the first year of the increase of capacity utilization, the inflation rate would be 1.3 percent. 
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After the second, third, fourth, and fifth year of the expansion, the inflation would be 2.9, 4.0, 4.8, and 5.4
percent respectively.  That is, inflation is likely to be well under control and the fear of inflation should not
be a reason against active aggregate demand policies.
7. Conclusion
In the past decade, with the acceleration of the state owned enterprise reform in China, the living
standards of large sections of the urban working class have been stagnating or deteriorating.  Economic
reform no longer brings about material benefits to working people.  Mainstream Chinese economists argue
that state and collective owned enterprises and their employment regime are fundamentally inefficient, and
better economic performance requires large-scale layoff of the state and the urban collective sector
workers.  In this paper, I argue that the mainstream reform strategy is misconceived.  The large-scale layoff
of the state and the urban collective sector workers not only involves enormous social costs that are
unjustifiable, but also has directly contributed to the recent economic downturn by contracting working
people's consumption demand.  This paper shows that the productivity of state and collective owned
enterprises to a large extent depends on capacity utilization and the level of aggregated demand.  If the
government undertakes active aggregate demand policy, such as expanding public investment, the
performance of state and collective owned enterprises can be substantially improved without large number
of workers being laid off, and this can be done with only a small increase of inflation.  If this is the case, then
a more open minded approach of economic reform with a consideration of the macroeconomic aspect (that
is, the fundamental instability of a market economy and the indispensable role of an interventionist
government) and social justice can lead to socially as well as economically more desirable results.
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1 For an illustration of Keynesian macroeconomic model, see Davidson (1998).
2 "ñ" (the output to utilized capital ratio) is assumed to be exogenous.  Strictly speaking, the output to utilized
capital ratio varies with the level of employment and cannot be decided without the determination of the labor
market equilibrium.  It is apparent from Figure C and equation (8) and (9) that each level of capacity utilization
corresponds to a unique labor market equilibrium.  Assume that at all labor market equilibria, the output to utilized
capital ratio remains constant.  This allows "ñ" to be treated as exogenous.
3 Since equation (8) assumes that price is set by adding a constant mark up to unit labor cost, profit-maximizing
firms should expand employment and output until they meet the constraint of workers’ bargaining power.  It
follows that the labor market equilibrium is determined where the mark up curve intersects the wage setting
curve. 
4 For the estimate of capacity utilization rates, see Appendix.
5 The implied labor elasticity of output is calculated by using the formula: implied labor elasticity of output = 1
+ LABOR – CAPITAL – MATERIALS, where LABOR, CAPITAL, and MATERIALS are the coefficients of these
variables.
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Appendix: Data Construction
(1) Output
Output is defined as real gross output value, which is the gross output value deflated by the producer
price index of industry.
(2) Capital
Real stock of capital is constructed from the original value of fixed assets (book value of capital) by
using the following formula:    
(13) KT  = t=1T (Vt - Vt-1)/PKt
where Vt is the original value of fixed assets in year t, and PKt is the fixed investment price index in year t.  For
the state owned enterprises and the collective owned enterprises, the original value of fixed assets in 1980 is
assumed to be equal to the newly added fixed assets in 1980.  For the other enterprises, similar assumption is
made with respect to the original value of fixed assets in 1988.
This method of deflating the original value of fixed assets is widely used in the Chinese and English
literature.  It is the same method as that used by Lo (1997), and similar to that used by Jefferson, Rawski, and
Zheng (1996), and Li and Zhong (1998).  Jefferson et al. and Li and Zhong are able to exclude non-productive
investment (such as employee residential buildings, employee hospitals and schools provided to employees'
children) from the state sector investment.  However, the relevant data are not available to this author.
The fixed investment price index is available in The China Statistical Yearbook since 1991.  I regress the
fixed investment price index between 1991-98 on the producer price index of the machine building industry and
the implicit GDP deflator of the construction industry.  The result is as follows: PFI = 0.75686*MACHINE +
0.262488*CONSTRUCTION, adjusted R-square is 0.9992.  This equation is then used to estimate the fixed
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investment price index before 1991.
(3) Materials
The materials input is defined as the difference between the gross output value and the value added.  The
real materials input is the materials input deflated by a constructed materials input price index, which is a weighted
average of the producer price index of the mining and quarrying industry (with a weight of 0.25), the producer
price index of raw materials industry (with a weight of 0.5), and the purchase price index of industrial farm crops
(with a weight of 0.25).
The value added of industrial enterprises with independent accounts is available since 1992. 
Between 1988-91, it can be calculated by adding the net output value with depreciation fund.  For
collective owned enterprises, I regress the value added between 1988-98 on the gross output value and
the inverse of the gross output value (the inverse is used to control for the level of the value added in the
initial year).  The regression result is then used to estimate the value added between 1980-88 (the
estimating equation is: VADDED = 157.289871 + 0.255734*GOV - 9.367822*GOVINVERSE,
adjusted R-square is 0.9708).
The value added of all industrial enterprises with independent accounts before 1988 can be
estimated by assuming that the share of all industrial enterprises with independent accounts in the China's
Industrial Gross Domestic Product is the same as their share in China's gross output value of industry. 
The difference between the estimated value added of all industrial enterprises with independent accounts
and the estimated value added of the collective owned enterprises is then assumed to be the value
added of the state owned enterprises.
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(4) Labor
Numbers of staff and workers of the entire state, collective, and other industrial sectors can be found
in The China Statistical Yearbook.  The numbers of staff and workers of the state, collective, and other industrial
enterprises with independent accounts are estimated by assuming that the average labor productivity of the
industrial enterprises with independent accounts of each type of ownership is the same as the average labor
productivity of the entire industrial sector of the relevant type of ownership.  The gross output value of the state,
collective, and other industrial sectors is available, allowing the calculation of these sectors' labor productivity.
(5) Capacity Utilization
There is no official measure of capacity utilization for the industrial sector.  I use the ratio of the time
trend of the capital-output ratio of all industrial enterprises with independent accounts over the actual capita-output
ratio as a proxy.  The time trend of the capital-output ratio is calculated from the following equation: TREND =
 -13.734753 + 0.007466 * YEAR, where YEAR is between 1980 and 1998. 
 The above data are available to reader by request.
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Table 1
China's Urban Unemployment, 1990-97
Registered
Unemployment (ten
thousand)
Registered
Unemployment Rate (%)
Unemployed Laid Off
Workers (ten thousand)
Actual Unemployment
Rate (%)*
1990 383.2 2.5
1991 352.2 2.3
1992 363.9 2.3
1993 420.1 2.6
1994 476.4 2.8 about 300 4.6
1995 520.0 2.9 409 5.2
1996 552.8 3.0 591 6.2
1997 570.0 3.1 1366 10.5
* Ratio of the sum of the registered unemployed and unemployed laid off workers to the urban labor force.
Source: ZGFB, 1998, pp. 467; Yang, 1997, pp. 218-221; Liu and Gao, 1999, pp.  299-304.  The Chinese State Statistical
Bureau provides statistics of registered unemployment rates in the urban sector.  A registered unemployed person is one
who makes registration at the government office as unemployed.  Workers who are “laid off” (xiagang) from state and
collective owned enterprises are technically not considered to be unemployed.  There are no official statistics of laid off
workers.  But some economists have made estimates of numbers of laid off workers in recent years.  These estimates are
available in Liu and Gao (1999) and Yang (1997). 
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Table 2
Analyzing the Productivity Growth of the State Owned Enterprises
(1981-98, 18 observations)
Dependent Variable PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY
INTERCEPT 0.063
(0.038)
0.035
(0.028)
0.040
(0.027)
CAPITAL -0.344
(0.350)
0.178
(0.279)
0.121
(0.264)
MATERIALS 0.490
(0.100)****
0.317
(0.083)***
0.323
(0.078)***
LABOR -0.675
(0.460)
-0.568
(0.324)*
-0.680
(0.310)**
CAPACITY 0.699
(0.178)***
0.747
(0.164)****
AR(1)
-0.375
(0.309)
Adj. R-square 0.672 0.838 0.828
D-W 1.712 2.302 2.099
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at 10% level.  **Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
**** Significant at 0.1% level.
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Table 3
Analyzing the Productivity Growth of the Collective Owned Enterprises
(1981-1998, 18 observations)
Dependent Variable PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY
INTERCEPT 0.002
(0.028)
-0.018
(0.029)
-0.035
(0.031)
CAPITAL 0.142
(0.248)
0.591
(0.354)
0.834
(0.322)**
MATERIALS 0.809
(0.134)****
0.488
(0.228)**
0.366
(0.205)*
LABOR 0.132
(0.164)
0.190
(0.158)
0.295
(0.175)
CAPACITY 0.593
(0.351)
0.787
(0.332)**
AR(1) 0.400
(0.289)
Adj. R-square 0.888 0.901 0.903
D-W 1.840 1.350 2.036
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at 10% level.  ** Significant at 5% level.
**** Significant at 0.1% level.
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Table 4
Analyzing the Productivity Growth of Other Enterprises
(1989-1998, 10 observations)
Dependent Variable PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY
INTERCEPT 0.033
(0.042)
0.035
(0.030)
0.041
(0.036)
CAPITAL 0.131
(0.135)
0.323
(0.122)**
0.299
(0.109)*
MATERIALS 0.706
(0.140)***
0.641
(0.104)***
0.618
(0.081)***
LABOR -0.089
(0.126)
-0.111
(0.091)
-0.121
(0.087)
CAPACITY 0.513
(0.199)**
0.375
(0.180)
AR(1) 0.520
(0.487)
Adj. R-square 0.757 0.875 0.857
D-W 1.018 1.245 1.465
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Significant at 10% level.  ** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
40
Table 5
Autonomous Demand Variables and Capacity Utilization
Dependent Variable CAPACITY CAPACITY CAPACITY
INTERCEPT -0.023
(0.039)
0.031
(0.037)
0.026
(0.026)
INVESTMENT 0.212
(0.121)*
0.268
(0.113)**
0.260
(0.073)***
FISCAL -0.226
(0.209)
-0.253
(0.233)
-0.281
(0.132)**
EXPORTS -0.018
(0.091)
-0.013
(0.079)
IMPORTS -0.008
(0.095)
-0.012
(0.077)
INVLAG -0.014
(0.121)
FISLAG -0.012
(0.195)
EXLAG -0.148
(0.075)
-0.139
(0.059)**
IMLAG -0.064
(0.080)
-0.077
(0.051)
Adj. R-square 0.008 0.371 0.556
D-W 2.254 1.629 1.594
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
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Table 6
Autonomous Demand Variables and Productivity
Dependent Variable Productivity (State) Productivity (Collective) Productivity (Other)
INTERCEPT 0.053
(0.032)
-0.045
(0.042)
0.241
(0.136)
CAPITAL -0.532
(0.277)*
0.238
(0.292)
0.206
(0.121)
MATERIALS 0.498
(0.082)****
0.751
(0.146)****
0.626
(0.110)**
LABOR -0.951
(0.368)**
0.142
(0.210)
-0.505
(0.236)
INVESTMENT 0.193
(0.054)***
0.167
(0.107)
-0.261
(0.263)
FISCAL 0.004
(0.099)
0.093
(0.179)
-0.688
(0.359)
EXPORTS 0.041
(0.041)
0.013
(0.077)
-0.415
(0.238)
IMPORTS -0.098
(0.042)**
-0.052
(0.095)
0.897
(0.503)
Adj. R-square 0.807 0.883 0.922
D-W 2.602 2.074 2.513
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
**** Significant at 0.1% level.
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Table 7
Capacity Utilization and Inflation
Dependent Variable COMPENSATION INFLATION
INTERCEPT 0.053
(0.030)*
-0.030
(0.030)
EXINFLATION 0.550
(0.219)**
0.370
(0.195)*
CAPITAL 0.680
(0.260)**
CAPACITY 0.820
(0.389)**
COMPENSATION 0.537
(0.209)**
Adj. R-square 0.330 0.476
D-W 1.937 2.071
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
